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Abstract--Games in which at least one player ,,m-t solve a combinatorial optimizatimt problem are 
studied. After a suitable tramd'ornmtion, some c2mes nmy be solved by consideration f a polym)nfisl 
system of equations. By finding all the solutions of this system, cite computes all the Nash eqnib- 
librls, and the pre-equilibrinm set, which may be of independeat in erest. The question ofa lack of 
equilibrimn is also resolved for these games. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Combinatorial optimization problems, in most cases, are identified with decision making processes 
of great complexity. The class of problems known as NP-complete has been the object of a great 
deal of study in recent years. For this class, there exist polynomial mappings between distinct 
problems in the class so that, if a good algorithm is found for one problem, it will provide a basis 
for a good algorithm for all NP-complete problems. One NP-complete problem, which has become 
increasingly studied and applied in recent years is zero-one integer linear programming. About 
twenty ears ago, M. Raghavachari [1] showed that the zero-one programming problem could be 
posed after suitable transformations a  a concave quadratic minimization problem with linear 
constraints. We observe now that the transformations between the members of the NP-complete 
problems will serve another purpose. They will allow the study of highly complex noncooperative 
games, in which one or more of the players is faced with a combinatorial optimization problem or a 
nonconvex minimization problem. Such studies are increasingly relevant, since today's industries 
are often faced with planning problems of a combinatorial type, and industries are almost always 
concerned with competitive nvironments. For example, see [2] for an application of zero-one 
programming in strategic planning. 
Noncooperative game theory, has its foundations in convex analysis. According to Nash [3] the 
"counter" move to a set of strategies i unique. A fixed point theorem of Kakutani is applied to 
the convex valued mapping, resulting from this assumption to obtain an existence proof. If there 
were two or more, equally good spatially distant counter moves to a given list of strategies from 
one's opponents, this was never explored. Now, we wish to analyze such circumstances. 
Historically, Nash's theory has been generalized in several directions. Glicksberg [4] worked 
on the sets of feasible strategies in compact Hausdorff space, while Rosen [5] proved existence 
and uniqueness of Nash equilibria. Gabay and Moulin [6] generalized slightly to obtain a condi- 
tion which can guarantee uniqueness, once existence is guaranteed. In the economics literature, 
Starr [7] showed that in markets with a very large number of traders, the outcome will be arbitrar- 
ily close to equilibrium, even if some of the player's preference functions are nonconvex. Recently, 
McClendon [8,9] has weakened some of the convexity assumptions by applying the notion of con- 
tractibility of sets. Computational or constructive methods for obtaining Nash equilibria re not 
given in those works, however. Kostreva [10] has set up a framework in which noncovex polyno- 
mial constraints and utility functions may be introduced in Nash games. Some of the existence 
theory developed for polynomials may now be interpreted for the discrete optimization case. It 
should also be noted that none of the above research says anything at all about the case of a 
game in which one player is solving a combinatorial optimization problem. Hence, this motivates 
the current study. 
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Discrete feasible sets and nonconvex functions will be treated in this paper without any as- 
sumptions on the number of players or contractibility of sets. Instead, we apply some powerful 
computational methods. The first method has been introduced in the operations research lit- 
erature by Garcia and ZangwilI [11]. It is usually referred to as homotopy continuation. An 
advantage of this approach is that, in certain cases, it is capable of finding all solutions to the 
given problem by means of path following in a homotopy. One such case is that of a system of n 
polynomial equations in n unknowns. From this important result, we show how it is possible to 
compute all pure strategy equilibria for the case of polynomial utility functions and polynomial 
constraints, including general (and hence concave) quadratic minimization. This idea relates well 
to the problem pointed out by Shapley [12]. He observed that some path following algorithms 
and fixed point computations are limited in their capability to compute multiple solutions, even 
if many paths are traced. Shapley gave a transformation which seems to make more solutions ac- 
cessible on general nonlinear problems. Results here will show that the polynomial theory is not 
so limited. The second method of computation we consider is the symbolic omputation of the 
Grobner basis of a zero-dimensional polynomial ideal. Since we wish to find all the solutions to a 
system of polynomial equations, one may compute a basis of the ideal generated by the defining 
polynomial functions within the ring of polynomials. From the Grobner basis, it is often possible 
to solve for all the solutions of the polynomial system. The computer algebra system MAPLE 
(see [13]), which has become increasingly popular on computers from Macintosh to mainframes, 
has a Grobner basis program which may be used to solve the games we are studying. 
2. THEORETICAL  DEVELOPMENT 
We first show how polynomials relate to the Nash theory of non-cooperative game theory. First, 
some definitions and notation must be introduced. From this, we follow Ichiishi [14]. The proofs 
of some of the theorems are omitted and may be found in [I0], which contains the framework for 
our approach to polynomial Nash games. 
A game in normal form consists of a set N of players, together with a strategy set and a utility 
function for each player. For Player j, let X i be the set of all strategies available to him. The 
set XJ may be discrete. Let X = I I jeNX j. Suppose that Player j represents his preference 
relation by a utility function uJ : X --* R. A game in normal form is defined as a list of data 
{X/,  uJ)jeN. All of the games will be considered in normal form. For our purposes, we assume 
XJ C_ ]~"J. Thus X C_ ]gk, where k = ~"~jeN nj. 
A Nash equilibrium of a game in norms] form {XJ, uJ)jeN is a/c-dimensional vector 
x* = (Zl, x2,..., Zn~, z, i+1, .. •, xn~+n2, znx+n~+1,  • • •, zk) • X 
such that u#(x*) _> uJ(x_#*,y) for every j • N for all y • X#. The notation (x_j, y) is 
meant to indicate the k-dimensional vector which M, rees with x* except on the nj components, 
representing Player j strategies; his strategies are represented by y • XJ C_ ~n#. Observe that 
a Nash equilibrium, uJ(x*) is the utility that Pl~yer j enjoys and that there is no incentive for 
him to change his strategy. Our Nash equilibria will be pure equilibria, not mixed. Also, note 
that this definition is global in that it pertains to all y • XJ. 
For our analysis, we need two slightly more general concepts, local equilibrium and pre- 
equilibrium. Kostreva [10] introduced pre-equilibrium, while the ides of local equilibrium has 
been around for some time. 
A local ~uilibrium of a game in normal form {X#, uJ }#¢N is a k dimensional vector i and a 
set of neighbourhoods Nj C_ XJ C_ RnJ such that for every j • N, uJ (~) _> uJ (~_j, y) for all 
y • Nj C X j . This definition generalizes the concept of local msximum of optimization theory. 
The pre-efuilibrium set of a game in normal form {XJ,uJ}jeN is theset  of k-dimensional 
real-valued vectors 7>, such that for every j • N, first order neceassry optimality conditions are 
satisfied for uJ (x) for each x • 7 >. We approach the theory in a computational way by means of 
the set 7>. By relaxing some set requirements, one by one, the following theorem arises 
THEOREM 1. Let G = {z j uJ)je~v be a game in normal form. Denote by.A~" the set of all Nash 
equilibria and by £ the set of all local equilibria, and let 7> denote the pre-equilibrium set. Then 
Xc£c7> 
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COROLLARY. / / '~  -- ~, then A f = 0 and £ = 0. 
The pre-equilibrium set may consist of a single point as the following example shows. 
EXAMPLE 1. 
Player 1: u 1 = - ( z -  1) 2, Player 2: u 2 = - (y  - 2) 2, 
X 1 = R; X 2 = R. 
The set 7 ~ may also be empty, as demonstrated in the following example. 
EXAMPLE 2. 
Player I: u I = z s + 3z, Player 2: u ~ = y, 
X 1 = It; X 2 = ]~. 
Player 1 satisfies first order necessary conditions only for complex values, while there is no 
solution to the first order necessary condition for Player 2. The pre-equilibrium set may consist 
of a single point, which is not a Nash equilibrium, as the following example shows. 
EXAMPLE 3. 
Player 1: U 1 ---- (x - 1) 2, Player 2: u 2 - - (y  - 2) 2, 
X I = 1~; X 2 = R. 
Both players satisfy first order necessary conditions at (z,y) = (1,2), which is not a Nash 
equilibrium since it is minimum for Player 1 and a maximum for Player 2. 
The pre-equilibrium set is clearly not dependent on concavity or quasi-concavity of the players' 
utility functions. It does not depend on the convexity of the set of Nash equilibria. Of course, for 
very general classes of functions, this set will be quite difficult to compute. However, in the case 
of u3 = p(x), a polynomial function, the computation of the set 7 ~ is a feasible calculation. In 
what follows, XJ need only be nonempty and u s continuous. Convexity and compactness of XJ 
will not be relevant, and quasi-concavity of the utility functions will not be required. 
By a polynomial function we mean a function of the form 
p(x) = ar (x l )  
f 
where the index r counts the terms. Each partied derivative of p(x) is likewise a polynomial 
function, i.e., 
~p /1 la • lk 
= a, (Xl) " (x2) . . . .  (xj) l : -1"'" (xk) " .  
Let the notation V:, denote then hi-dimensional gradient with respect o the variables of Player i. 
THEOREM 2. Let {XJ,uJ}j~N be a game/n normal form. Assume that for each j E N, u j is a 
polynom/a/function fx  E X = HjeNX j . Let X j = ~tn~. Then the pre-equilibrium set 7 ~ is the 
set of real solutions to the polynomial system of k equations in k unkowns. 
[V.,U (X)]ieN = 0. 
Thus far the games we have considered have been "unconstrained" in the sense of nonlinear 
programming. In order to get to combinatorial optimization, we need to introduce the next 
level of complexity, the so called "abstract economy." An abstract economy can be formulated 
by adding the concept of feasibility to a game in normal form. As before, let N be the set of 
players, let X j be the strategy set for Player j and define X - H jeNX j. The feasible strategy 
correspondence for Player j is a correspondence F j : X ---, X j . Once all players have chosen their 
strategies, x E X, the feasibility of the j th  player is given by the subset FJ(x) of XJ.  For this 
type of game, the other players influence Player j in two ways: 
(1) directly, through his utility function uJ, and 
(2) indirectly, by changing F j. 
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Ichiishi [14] states that an abstract economy is not a game beca~tse a Player j must know the 
other's strategies in order to determine his own constraint set. Other authors refer to this same 
arrangement as a generalized Nash game or as a game with joint constraints. If it is possible for 
a collection of players to make FJ (x) empty by some choice of strategies, then the game cannot 
be played by Player j . For our development, i  will make little difference which nomenclature is 
used. More general constraints sets XJ, dependent or not dependent on the remaining players, 
are covered by the following. 
The abstract economy is a list of specified ata {XJ, FJ,uJ)jGN. A noncooperative solution 
concept, the social equilibrium, is seen to generalize the Nash equilibria of a game in normal form. 
A social equilibrium of an abstract economy (XJ, F j , u j }jEN is a k-dimensional vector x* E X 
such that for every j E N, 
Prj(x*) E F~(x'), (1) 
u~(x') _> uJ(x_j*,y) for all y E FJ(x') .  (2) 
Here the notation Prj(x*) denotes the projection x* on Player j 's variables. Note that (1) says 
that Player j is using a feasible strategy, and (2) says that Player j cannot find a feasible strategy 
to bring about a higher utility level than the current level uJ (x*). 
Because the notion of social equilibrium is so similar to Nash equilibrium, the set of local 
equilibria and the pre-equilibrium set carry over simply by replacing a game in normal form with 
an abstract economy in the definition. Hence, we get the analog of Theorem 1. 
THEOREM 3. Let {X  j , F j , u j }jEN be all abstract economy. Denote by 8 the set of social equi- 
libria, by £ the set of all local social equilibria and by 7 ~ the pre-equilibrium set. Then 
8g£g~.  
In this paper, the approach is not to prove existence, but to derive a square polynomial system 
of equations which contains all pre-equilibria, and hence, all social equilibria, within its solution 
set. Recall the first order necessary conditions for a local maximum. 
THEOREM 4 (KUHN-TUCKER). Let x* be a relative maximum for the problem 
gJ (x_j, y) >_ O, where hJ 
pre-equilibrium set ~ is 
(k + rn + p) equations/n 
maximize f(z) 
subject to h(x) = o, g(x) > o 
where h : ~n _~ ~m and g : l~ n -* 1~ P. 
Suppose x* is a regular point for constraints. Then there is a vector Jt E 1~ m and a vector 
p E R P, with p >_ O, such that 
VI (x ' )  +Jr T Vh(x*) +pr  Vg(x') -- O, 
/*igi(x*) -- O, i = 1 ,2 , . . .  ,p. 
The next theorem applies the Kuhn-Tucker esult to derive a polynomial system for the pre- 
equilibrium set ~ of an abstract economy. 
THEOREM 5. Let {XJ, F j, uJ}je~v be an abstract economy. Assume that for each j E N, uJ is a 
polynomial function of x E X,  and that the correspondence FJ(x) = {y E XJ [ hJ(x_j ,y) = 0, 
: ]~k _.+ Wn~ and f : ]~k _+ Rp~ are polynomial} is given. Then, the 
contained in the set of all real solutions to the polynomial system of 
(k + m + p) unknowns. 
+ V,j + d T 1 
([¢], [¢(=)1.).....,3 
where m = Y'~j~.N rnj and p = ~'~jEN PJ" 
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THEOREM 6. Let {XJ,FJ,  uJ}jeN be an abstract economy. Assume that at least one player has 
a combinatorial optim~ation problem which is polynomially transformable to zero-one integer 
linear programming. In addition, assume that for each j • N, u j is a polynonual function of 
x • X,  and that correspondence FJ(x) = {y • XJ [ hJ(x_j,y) = 0, gJ(x_j,y) ~_ 0, where 
hJ : ~k ~ ~mj and gJ : ~k ~ ~vj are polynomial} is given. Then the pre-equilibrium set 7~ is 
contained in the set of al/real solutions to the polynomial system (.). 
PROOF. The transformed version of the zero-one integer programming problem will have a con- 
cave quadratic polynomial objective function including the penalty term M x T (e -  x), where M 
is a suitably large positive number and e is a vector of ones. The linear constraints are maintained 
and they are polynomial functions. The integer estrictions are relaxed to the upper and lower 
bounds e > x > 0, which again are polynomial functions. Therefore, everything can be solved in 
terms of the above system of polynomial equations. | 
THEOREM 7. Let { XJ, FJ, uJ}j~N be an abstract economy. Assume that at least one player has 
a combinatorial optim~ation problem which is polynomially transformable to zero-one integer 
linear programming. In addition, assume that for each j • N, u i is a polynomial function of 
x • X,  and that correspondence FJ(x) = {y • X j ] hJ(x_j,y) -- 0, gJ(x_j,y) ~_ 0, where 
hJ : ~k ..., ]~mj and gJ : ~k ..., ~p~ are polynomial} is given. Then the game has no social 
equilibrium, ff there are no real solutions to the polynomial system (.). 
The results contained in this section have shown how to compute the set 7 ~ (and hence the 
set of all Nash or social equilibria) by means of finding all solutions to a system of polynomial 
equations. Recent progress in computational methods have produced both the theory and im- 
plemented algorithms which make the solution of polynomial systems of equations a manageable 
computation. We review them briefly here. 
Garcia and Li [15] and Garcia and Zangwill [11] provided aspecialized numerical method based 
on path following in a polynomial homotopy. A modification of the original Garcia-Li homotopy 
by Morgan [16] allows a decrease in the number of paths which need to be followed by the 
method. Finally, HOMPACK/POLSYS, a FORTRAN implementation f the method, has been 
produced by Watson, et al. [17]. This implementation makes the homotopy continuation method 
for polynomials systems readily available. Additional references on the method may be found in 
any of the above papers. The method works as follows. 
Suppose F(x) = 0 is a system of n polynomial equations in n unknowns zj, j = 1,... ,n, with 
real coefficients. One defines a mapping, called a homotopy, which connects the given system 
F(x) = 0 to an easily solvable starting system G(x) = 0, so that all the geometrically isolated 
solutions of F(x) = 0 have at least one associated homotopy path. Such a path will originate 
from one of the easily obtained solutions of the starting system G(x) = 0. The algorithm will 
find all solutions by tracking all such plants. 
Given a polynomial function of n variables 
= (xl)  '1, 
r 
the total degree of p(x) is mrax{~'~ k irk}. In order to guarantee that all roots are accessible, we 
must use complex space. Let C n denote the n-dimensional complex Euclidean space, and define 
G : C n --+ C n, by Gj(x) = bj zj ~ -a  j, j - 1 , . . . ,n ,  where aj and bj are nonzero complex 
numbers and dj is the total degree of the polynomial Fj(x) for j = 1,. . . ,  n. 
Define the homotopy map 
po( , x )  = (1 - + 
where c = (a, b), a = (az, . . . ,  an) e C n and b = (bl , . . . ,  b,) • Cn. Let d = did2..,  dn = I I ;=  1 dj 
be the total degree of the system. 
The following theorem is in [16]. It forms the basis of the HOMPACK/POLSYS, one solver 
we have used for our computations. 
THEORe.M 8. For almost all choices of a and b in C n, p~'l(0) consists of d smooth paths emanating 
from {0} x C n, which either diverge to infinity as ~ approaches I, or converge to solutions to 
~/10o11-0 
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F(x) -" 0 as A approaches 1. Each geometrically isolated solution of F(x) has a path converging 
to it. 
Prom this theorem, we may derive the following result for the pre-equilibrium set P. 
THEOltEM 9. Let d be the totM degree of the polynomial system (.) associated with either a 
game in normal form or an abstract economy for which at/e~st one player has a combinatorial 
optimization problem. Assume that the polynomial system of equations (.) is regular. Then the 
max/mum number of geometrically isolated points in P is d. 
PItOOF. Since each geometrically isolated solution of the polynomial system has a path associated 
with it, and there are only d paths, the result follows. | 
Once one obtains the set P, a task of classification ofpoints must be performed. To do this, one 
may apply the second order sufficiency conditions to the optimization problem of each player j,  to 
ascertain whether the current point is a local maximum, a local minimum or neither. In certain 
cases, higher order optimality conditions may be necessary in order to complete the classification. 
It would be of interest o know how many of the points in P are Nash equilibria or Social 
equilibria. The number of equilibria is, however, not strictly less than the number of points in :P, 
as was shown in Example 1. An estimate on the number of equilibria will be dependent on the 
degree of each player's utility function, as well as the number and degree of the constraints of 
each player. 
3. EXAMPLE 
In this section, the previously derived theory and method will be applied to a somewhat more 
complex example. 
EXAMPLE 4. 
Player 1 wishes to maximize 
f (z ,y)  = -z  4 "b 12z a - 38z ~ + (12 + y)z + (63 - 3y) 
zEFt=R.  
with respect o the variable z; 
Player 2 wishes to maximize 
g(y, z) = y + z with respect o the variables y and z; 
y, zEF2- '{y ,z ]4y+5z<8,  yE{O, 1}, zE {0,1}}. 
The polynomial system for the first order necessary optimality condition is: 
-4z  3 + 36z 2 - 76z  +y+ 12 = O, 
4-  lOy-  4w-  u+t  = O, 
4-  lOz -  5w-  v+s  = O, 
8w - 4y w - 5z w = 0, 
u-yu=O,  
v -vz ' -O ,  
ty=0,  
sz=O. 
We see that this polynomial system of eight equations has eight unknowns and the total degree 
d = 3. I .  I .  2 .2 .2 .2 .2  - 96. We obtain the following sets of solutions in ~ and S, respectively, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
From this set I >, we see that there are four local equilibria (max l, max 2), (max l ,max 2), 
(max 2,max 1) and (max 2, max 2). Player 2 is indifferent with respect o these points, since all 
have utility g - 1.0. The points are spatially distinct and because of the indifference of Player 2, 
f 
ayer > 
max 2 
Pre -Equ i l ib r ium 
max 1 min max 2 
(0.17, 1,0) (.17, 0,0) (0.17, 0,1) 
(3.0,0,1) (2.96, 1,0) (3.0, 0,0) 
(5.83, 1,0) (5.83,0,0) (5.83,0,1) 
NMh games 
Nash  Equ i l ib r ia  
f 
a~___ max 1 
ax 1 (0.17, 1,0) 
in 
max 2 
(5.83, 1,o) 
min max 2 
(o.17, o,1) 
(s.83,o,1) 
Figure 1. 
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they become more interesting to Player 1. Of these four local equilibria, there is only one global 
Nash equilibria (=, y, z) = (5.83, 1, 0). 
The solutions presented here were obtained in two different ways: HOMPACK/POLSYS and 
MAPLE. Of the 96 paths traced by HOMPACK/POLSYS, 41 paths produced real roots of which 
9 were feasible. MAPLE produced the Grobner basis: 
[u2v+6vu,  t2v+6tv ,  40z3-360=2+760z-4w-116-u+t ,  s tg+4ts ,  vu2+6vu,  vs, 
4t s + t s 2, 5tz + 88 t2 + 272t, -4  + lO z + Sw + v - s, vt2 + 4t v, 5w s - sz - 4s, ut, 
4uw+ u2 +6u, -4+ lOy+4w+ u- t ,  5wv+ v2 +6v,  4 tw- t2 -4t ,  us~ +4ns ,  
8v z +61v2+78v,  41w2-u2-v2- t2 -s  2 -4 t -6u-4s -6v+44w,  su2 +6us ,  
s 3 + 28 s 9 + 96 s, 5u z + 44 u ? + 84 u]. 
J 
From this basis the same real roots were obtained by back substitution. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents computational pproaches to Nash equilibria in the case of the presence 
of combinatorial optimization. The concept of pre-equilibrium set generalizes the Nash equlib- 
rium. With the notion of pre-equilibrium set, we formulate certain systems of polynomial equa- 
tions relevant to games in normal form and to abstract economies. By means of homotopy contin- 
uation or Grobner bases, one may compute the pre-equilibrium set. Since the pre-equilibrium set 
contains the equilibria, we have a method all Nash equilibria for games in normal form, and all 
social equilibria for abstract economies for the important case of polynomial functions. The com- 
binatorial optimization game is covered by transformations to a system of polynomials through 
zero-one programming and concave quadratic minimization. 
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